In this study we show that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) with more powerful CEOs have higher performance variability. A powerful CEO is defined as one that also chairs the board of directors. CEO power is reflected in higher performance variability if CEOs have more latitude of action, i.e. managerial discretion. Managerial discretion can be limited by having stakeholder electives on the board. We find that CEO power only has an effect on MFI performance variability when there are no stakeholder electives on the board. Furthermore, we argue that CEOs in non-profit MFIs have more discretion, because their dual mission implies their CEOs are harder to control. We find that CEO power increases performance variability of non-profit MFI's, while it has no effect for other MFI types.
Introduction
Responding to the research agenda proposed by Mersland and Strøm (2009) this paper studies whether powerful CEOs matter for the performance of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs).
CEOs of MFIs face a dilemma: they want to deliver financial services to the poor, which is costly, while they want to be financially sustainable to avoid going bankrupt. If poorer borrowers are less profitable than richer borrowers, these CEOs have to strike a balance between financial sustainability and serving poor borrowers. Different MFI stakeholders, such as clients, employees and donors, and other board members can have different opinions on how to strike this balance. The final balance is a product of the decision-making power of the different board members and the CEO. Whereas powerful CEOs tend to take all the major decisions, less powerful CEOs take decisions in consensus with the other board members.
Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991) and literature on managerial discretion, Adams et al. (2005) argue that in a firm in which the CEO takes the most relevant decisions, the risk emanating from judgment errors is not well diversified. They show that if CEOs are more powerful, they are likely to take more extreme decisions, which results in more variable firm performance.
We extend the work of Adams et al. (2005) and show how CEO power will affect MFI performance variability when there are stakeholder electives on the board and when an MFI has a non-profit status. We argue that stakeholder electives on the board exercise control such that the CEO takes less extreme decisions. We also argue that CEOs of non-profit MFIs have more managerial discretion or latitude in decision making, because the dual mission of non-profit MFIs makes it more difficult to control the CEO. So we expect that CEO power will affect performance variability more strongly when there are no stakeholder representatives on the board and when the MFI is a non-profit.
Although it can be argued that CEO power increases performance variability, there are also arguments in the literature that suggest that CEO power will decrease performance variability. The basic opposite argument states that when a CEO does not receive incentive pay and receives income only from one MFI, the CEO is more risk-averse than the shareholders who can diversify their risk across many MFIs. Therefore, a more powerful CEO will choose to take less extreme decisions. Pathan (2009) finds evidence for this hypothesis in the US banking sector. Yet, we argue that shareholders of MFIs are typically not well diversified. Therefore, it is more likely that CEO power will increase performance variability.
To investigate this hypothesis, we perform two types of regression analyses: applying (panel) heteroskedasticity tests and using standard deviations of performance over time as dependent variable. We use a novel dataset, utilized by Mersland and Strøm (2009) , consisting of information obtained from MFI rating agencies. It consists of 280 MFIs from 60 countries over the years 2000 to 2007. We measure CEO power with a dummy that indicates whether the CEO and the chairman of the board are the same person. We find evidence that return on assets (ROA) and operating costs scaled by average loan size are more variable in MFIs in which the CEO has greater power to influence decisions. Moreover, we find that CEO power can be constrained by stakeholder electives, because CEO power only increases performance variability when there are no stakeholder electives on the board. Furthermore, consistent with the hypothesis that CEOs of non-profits have more managerial latitude, we find that non-profit MFIs have higher performance variability.
Our paper adds to the literature in microfinance governance, which has so far mainly looked at the relation between performance and MFI-specific variables. For instance, Hartarska (2005) finds that external governance mechanisms -in particular performancebased compensation schemes -are not associated with better performance. Furthermore, Mersland and Strøm (2009) find that CEO power increases portfolio yield, but do not find an effect of CEO power for their other performance variables. They argue that CEO power can simultaneously have positive and negative effects on performance, which cancel each other out. We use performance variability as dependent variable in which these effects do not cancel each other out.
In general, our paper also adds to the literature that tries to assess the impact of governance variables on performance variability. When CEOs are powerful, monitoring by inside directors could be less effective, necessitating the need for outside directors (Combs et al. 2007 ). We find that CEO power can be constrained by having stakeholder electives on the board. Furthermore, Adams et al. (2005) show that CEO power only affects performance variability in high discretion industries. High discretion industries are industries in which managers have more latitude of action. We argue that non-profits are comparable to high discretion industries, due to their multi-objective nature, and find evidence that CEOs of nonprofits also have higher discretion. Furthermore, Aggarwal, Evans and Nanda (2006) show that in non-profits with larger boards, managers are less sensitive to pay-for-performance incentives. Consistent with these results and as also found by Cheng (2008) , we find that return on assets variability is negatively related to board size. This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we develop our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data. We test our hypotheses and present our findings in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Theory and hypothesis development
There is a wide array of literature that can be used to make predictions about the relationship between CEO power and performance variability. In this section we first discuss what determines the extremity of board decisions, where we argue that powerful CEOs are likely to take more extreme decisions. Next, we argue that the extremity of CEO decisions can be limited by a board's stakeholder electives. We also argue that stakeholder electives are especially important for non-profits, since their CEOs are more difficult to control. Finally, CEO power has different dimensions, which are not all easy to measure. Therefore, we discuss how CEO duality can be used to proxy CEO power.
Performance variability and board structure
When optimal board choices are unclear, managerial biases can affect firm outcomes, resulting in management decisions of variable quality. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) argue that especially top management teams face considerable ambiguity in running complex organizations, which makes them prone to judgment errors. In the economics literature, Sah and Stiglitz (1991) develop a model of decision-making in which individuals disagree due to their judgment errors. To reach a consensus they have to comprise. The compromise made by the group tends to be less extreme than a decision made by an individual, since group decisions involve a diversification of opinions effect. This diversification effect diminishes when some members have more power. So, board member power increases the extremity of group decisions, which leads to our first hypothesis:
H.1 CEO power increases MFI performance variability
This hypothesis implicitly assumes that more powerful CEOs will also exercise their power by taking more instead of less extreme decisions. Within a principal-agent setting, a CEO can use its power to take decisions that are less in line with those desired by the principal, which are the shareholders in case of for-profit MFIs and the stakeholders in case of non-profit MFIs. In line with hypothesis 1, more powerful CEO can decide to take more extreme decisions because they benefit him, for instance in terms of increased consumption of perquisites or the prestige associated with extreme decisions. Yet the CEO can also decide to take less extreme decisions to reduce the risk of performing badly. CEOs of MFIs cannot diversify their risk across many MFIs, whereas shareholders can diversify this risk. Therefore, shareholders might prefer more risky projects than the CEO. Conversely, CEOs have little to gain from bearing more risk and everything to lose when the MFI goes bankrupt. Nonetheless, shares of shareholder-owned MFIs are typically privately held (CMEF, 2005) , which suggests that these shareholders are not diversified across many MFIs. Therefore, it is not likely that shareholders of shareholder-owned MFIs prefer more risky projects than the CEO. For stakeholders of non-shareholder-owned MFIs, which are typically non-profits, it is more difficult to make such a statement. On the one hand they are less risk-and profit-oriented, but on the other hand they prefer MFIs to lend to very poor borrowers, which is typically more risky.
The moderating effect of stakeholder representatives on CEO power
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , the interests of principals and agents differ. To align the interests of self-interested agents with those of the principal, boards can install outside directors. This tends to restrain the power of CEOs, since outside directors are better positioned to protect shareholders' and stakeholders' interests. MFIs often have outside directors with a direct interest in the MFI. These are board members that are elected by stakeholders like clients, employees and donors. These stakeholder electives have other interest and are less likely to agree with the CEO than board members not elected by stakeholders. Moreover, clients, employees and donors have little interest in a more volatile MFI performance. To them it constitutes an extra risk, which comes at no apparent reward.
In general, stakeholder electives represent particular groups whose interests are not always in line with those of the MFI. Therefore, if we apply the framework developed by Combs et al. (2007) and replace outside directors by stakeholder electives, stakeholder electives should only be used to neutralize CEO power. That is, CEO power should be balanced against the number of stakeholder electives. So it is optimal to have high CEO power and a large percentage of stakeholder electives or low CEO power and a small percentage of stakeholder electives. In our framework, such a balance of power results in a higher diversification of opinions effect and thus lower performance variability.
Conversely, an imbalance of power results from high CEO power combined with a small percentage of stakeholder electives. This results in more performance variability, since monitoring by inside directors is less effective when the CEO is powerful. Moreover, according to power circulation theory (Ocasio, 1994) , as long as the CEO's position is not contested by inside board members, they will align with the CEO to maximize the rewards of their current position within the existing power structure. Therefore, our second hypothesis is: Another imbalance of power results from low CEO power combined with a large percentage of stakeholder electives. Similar to a relatively powerful CEO, relatively powerful stakeholder electives imply that there is less diversification of board member opinions. So boards with relatively powerful stakeholder electives also take more extreme decisions.
1 Conversely, MFI boards with low CEO power combined with a small percentage of stakeholder electives take 1 Note that Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) provide the opposite argument that outside directors lean heavily on short-term accounting, which provides an incentive for management to focus on low risk, low reward projects. This would imply that a large percentage of stakeholder electives, combined with low CEO power results in less performance variability. Yet, for MFIs this is less likely, since most MFIs are not publicly traded and have shareand stakeholders that have a long-term focus.
less extreme decisions. Due to a more balanced division of power, decisions reflect board consensus more and are therefore less extreme. This leads to the following sub-hypothesis:
H2b Specifically, when there are no stakeholder electives on the board, the relationship between low CEO power and performance variability is negative
The moderating effect of non-profit status on CEO power
A non-profit firm can earn profits but faces a non-distribution constraint as no particular group or person can claim ownership of, or receive residual earnings from a non-profit firm.
Theoretical literature on non-profits argues that this non-distribution constraint reduces the information asymmetry problem that is associated with the inability of consumers to observe quality ex ante (Hansmann, 1980; Mersland, 2009) . It is assumed that due to the nondistribution constraint, only organizations driven by non-monetary motivations, such as altruism, or other pro-social norms, will register as nonprofit organizations. Next, it is argued that because these organizations do not have a monetary incentive to lower costs by reducing the quality of goods and services, the information asymmetry problem is lower for this subset of organizations (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . This implies that non-profit MFIs are expected to focus more on social objectives and should thus reach poorer customers than for-profit MFIs (Mersland, 2009 ).
Yet, entrepreneurs starting a non-profit enterprise are not necessarily altruists. Indeed, in an incomplete contracting framework, the model of Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) shows why a selfish entrepreneur would want to start a non-profit rather than a for-profit firm. Like the previous literature, their model predicts that non-profits deliver higher quality output than forprofits. The CEOs of non-profits, however, can also consume more perquisites, since they face the non-distribution constraint. Although the non-distribution constraint eases the monetary incentives to reduce quality, it increases the incentives to consume the profits that cannot be distributed, i.e. excess profits, as perquisites. Especially when CEOs are not completely altruistic or when they are less effectively controlled by the board, the freedom to consume these excess profits as perquisites is greater.
From the management literature we know that managers operating in industries with high product differentiation are allowed more discretion (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995) .
In these industries it is relatively ambiguous to determine how a firm makes its profits.
Differentiated products are difficult to compare, which makes it difficult for shareholders to assess what determines success. Likewise, it is difficult for MFI stakeholders to assess whether CEOs of MFIs strike the right balance between financial and social objectives. Nonprofit MFIs face the most difficult trade-off; unlike a bank, which objective is first and foremost to make a profit, they have to reach out to the poor and simultaneously be financially sustainable. Moreover, social performance of MFIs is difficult to measure. From multi-task agency theory we know that under dual objectives of which one is difficult to measure, it is suboptimal to offer variable incentive schemes to incentivize the CEO (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) . Moreover, in non-profit MFIs such incentives schemes are often forbidden (Hartarska, 2005) . Therefore, stakeholders may find it difficult to control the extent to which an MFI meets its dual objectives, which allows CEOs of non-profit MFIs more discretion to take extreme decisions.
CEOs of MFIs are also allowed more discretion if MFI success is attributed to a CEO's 'visionary' leadership, which is often the case for non-profit MFIs or financial institutions created from non-profit MFIs (Labie, 2001) . Moreover, institutions dominated by a founding entrepreneur might tend to select board members based on friendship or prior relationship, which further increases CEO power. In general, the potential weaker governance structures of NGOs compared to other MFIs increase CEO power (Mersland, 2009 
CEO power and CEO duality
Proxies that are typically used to measure CEO power include CEO board tenure, CEO ownership, CEO only insider on the board, CEO is founder and CEO/chairman duality (Combs et al. 2007 , Almeida et al., 2005 . CEO/chairman duality implies that the CEO and board chair are the same person. Due to data availability issues, we only use CEO/chairman duality as proxy, where CEO/chairman duality indicates high CEO power and no CEO/chairman duality indicates low CEO power. Being a chairman increases a CEO's power, since the chairman often has an important role in strategic decision making. According to agency theory, CEO/chairman duality should be avoided, since more CEO power results in less stakeholder control. Indeed, CEO/chairman duality can signals CEO entrenchment, which increases CEO perquisite consumption Weisbach, 1991, 1998 ).
Yet, CEO power could also enhance decision-making effectiveness. According to the strategic leadership literature, powerful CEOs can adapt strategies more quickly and can act as a focal point for external accountability (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994) . Within an MFI, powerful leadership establishes a clear line of authority and can therefore be an important source of competitive advantage. This positive performance effect could cancel out the aforementioned negative effect, which makes the effect of CEO power on performance ambiguous. The advantage of relating CEO power to performance variability, is that we take both large positive and negative performance consequences of CEO power into account, without these effects cancelling each other out.
Data
Our Ratingfund 2 dataset contains information from risk assessment reports of five microfinance rating agencies: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril, which are official rating agencies approved by the C-GAP Ratingfund. The C-GAP rating assessment methodology reveals no major difference in MFI assessment relevant to variables used in this study.
In This is not problematic since our main focus is non-profit MFIs. Also the virtually endless number of very small savings and credit cooperatives are not included since these generally operate in isolation from the rest of the microfinance industry. We expect the effect of CEO power to be even greater for the very small MFIs, since they often miss adequate governance structures. In this regard, our estimates of CEO power are probably conservative. Finally, development programs that offer microcredit only as a social service are not in the dataset. This is however not problematic, since they do not face a trade-off ambiguity between sustainability and profitability. Conversely, the 280 MFIs in the dataset do face this trade-off and are willing to be evaluated on this trade-off. They represent commercial and professionally oriented institutions that have decided to be rated to improve access to funding, benchmark themselves against others, and increase transparency 3 .
Rating agencies collected the data, which makes our data source probably more and also about a third of these MFIs is a non-profit. (panel C).
CEO Power and Performance Variability
Similar to Adams et al. (2005) We use a dummy variable that is one when the CEO and chairman of the board are the same person as a proxy for CEO power. For our panel, Table 3 presents a simple variance Ftest of the difference in performance variance of MFIs with high CEO power compared to MFIs with low CEO power. It shows that MFIs with high CEO power have significantly higher return on assets and operational cost variability than MFIs with low CEO power. The variability of OSS is also significantly higher for powerful CEOs, but only at the 7% significance level.
Heteroskedasticity Tests
To apply Glesjer's (1969) 
where P i,t indicates either return on assets, portfolio yield, operational costs scaled by average loan size or OSS. In the next step of Glesjer's heteroskedasticity test, we take the absolute value of the residuals, it ε , and regress these on the same explanatory variables used in model (1). Both in the first and the second regression we use clustered robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity.
The CEO is chairman dummy is used to measure high CEO power. Our controls include number of international boards members and MFI has international shareholders dummy, since they could bring in international knowledge and good governance practices.
We include a CEO is female dummy since MFIs serve mostly female customers, which might be better served by a female CEO. Indeed, Mersland and Strøm (2009) Table 4 reports the results of model (1). They provide evidence for hypothesis 1 that CEO power increases performance variability. That is, the variability in terms of return on assets and operational cost variability is significantly different for powerful CEOs. Also for OSS the effect is close to being significant at the 10% level, confirming findings for return on assets and operational costs. However, for portfolio yield variability CEO power is insignificant. Portfolio yield is the only performance variable that is not influenced by costs, which suggests that CEOs mainly exercise their power by influencing costs. CEO power also appears to be economically sizeable. For instance, the effect of CEO = chairman on return on assets variability is approximately equal to the effect of a decrease in board size of 12 members. Furthermore, having no stakeholder electives on the board results in less extreme decisions. Table 4 shows that the main effect of No stakeholder electives on the board on performance variability is negative. This provides initial evidence for hypothesis 2b, since most MFIs in our sample have CEOs that are not powerful. Finally, although we do not report the coefficients of our MFI type dummies, for our analyses in 4.3 it is important to note that the non-profit dummy is never significant.
CEO power and performance variability over time
To isolate the effect of CEO power on within-firm, over-time variability we regress the standard deviation of MFI performance over time on the independent variables of model (1), which are averaged over the sample period. 9 This is to differentiate our hypothesis from other hypotheses that focus on finding explanations for cross-sectional differences in performance.
CEO power need not be related to extreme decisions within an MFI. For instance, if powerful CEOs either pursue only financial or pursue only social goals, performance variability in the cross-section instead of performance variability over time would drive the results. Table 5 displays the results of regressing performance variability over time on the averaged independent variables. They confirm the results in Table 4 , although they are less significant due to the reduced degrees of freedom. CEO power increases the variability of return on assets and operational costs and this effect is economically large. The average return on assets standard deviation is 0.06, while CEO-chairman duality increases it with 0.02. The average operational costs standard deviation of 0.07 is more than doubled to 0.15 when the CEO and the chairman are the same person.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Stakeholders and CEO power
As an instrument to limit the power of CEOs, MFIs can have stakeholder electives on the board, although not every MFI in our sample uses this instrument. Therefore, CEO power will have a more positive effect on performance variability, if an MFI has no stakeholder electives on the board. To test hypothesis 2a, we first make a no stakeholder electives dummy that equals one if there are no clients, employees or donors on the board and zero otherwise. Next we interact this dummy with CEO power 10 . By construction of the interaction effect, the main effect of no stakeholders now measures the effect of low CEO power combined with having no stakeholders on the board, which can be used to evaluate hypothesis 2b.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE ] Table 6 and 7 report the results of the cross-section and panel analyses, respectively.
We find positive significant results for the interaction of CEO power and our no stakeholder electives dummy for return on assets and operational costs variability. This confirms hypothesis 2a and implies that powerful CEOs who are not controlled by stakeholder electives increase performance variability, which suggests that uncontrolled CEOs tend to influence decisions more. Consistent with hypothesis 2b we find a negative main effect of no stakeholder electives on return on assets variability. As noted above, this is because CEOs with less power more easily reach consensus with other board members when stakeholder 10 Note that we wanted to try specifications with different interactions for each stakeholder group. This did not offer insights, however, since when an MFI has no client electives it is very likely to have no employee and donor electives on the board as well. That is, the dummies no clients electives, no employee electives and no donor electives are highly correlated.
electives are absent. This increase in board consensus is reflected in lower performance variability.
Furthermore, the main effect of CEO power becomes insignificant, which implies that there is no effect of CEO power on performance variability when there are client, employee or donor electives on the board. So if the CEO is powerful, stakeholder electives can effectively neutralize the CEO's power. Finally, in Table 6 we find a negative interaction effect for OSS. This is inconsistent with the results on our other dependent variables and hypothesis 2a.
Although we do not have an explanation for this result, note that the sample for which OSS is available is somewhat smaller than that of the other dependent variables. Nonetheless, also for this sample the effect of CEO power on OSS variability is positive and significant and the effect of no stakeholder electives is negative and significant.
Managerial discretion and MFI type
According to the management literature (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995) , managerial discretion differs between industries due to factors like competition, product differentiation and regulatory constraints. Similarly, CEOs have more discretion in types of MFIs that have dual objectives; non-profits. Conversely, in other types of MFIs powerful CEOs have less discretion. To test this, we run the regressions in 4.1 and 4.2 and add an interaction term between CEO power and a dummy which is one when an MFI is a non-profit. If our hypothesis is correct, this interaction term will become significant, while the main effect of CEO power will become insignificant.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE ] Table 8 and 9 report the results of the panel and cross-section analyses, respectively, which support hypothesis 3. That is, the interaction between CEO power and non-profit is positive and significant for operational costs in the panel regressions and for return on assets, operational costs and OSS in the cross-section regressions. This implies that CEO power increases performance variability when an MFI is a non-profit. Also, the main effect of CEO power becomes insignificant when we add the interaction of CEO power with non-profit. This implies that CEO power does not increase performance variability for other MFI types than non-profits. Finally, the main effect of MFI type (not shown) is insignificant, which implies that non-profits only have higher performance variability when they have powerful CEOs.
Conclusions
In this paper we study whether powerful CEOs, proxied by CEO/Chair duality, influence the performance variability of the MFI. The results indicate that MFIs with more powerful CEOs have higher performance variability if CEOs have sufficient managerial discretion. When there are stakeholder electives on the board, a CEO's discretion is limited. Consistently, we find that CEO power only has an effect on MFI performance variability when there are no stakeholder electives on the board, while there is no effect of CEO power on performance variability when there are stakeholder electives on the board.
Whether stakeholders electives should be on the board, however, is an open question.
In terms of increasing MFI chances of survival by limiting the risk, it is probably a good thing.
Our results imply, however, that an MFI with a powerful CEO is not only one with the worst performance, it is also one with the best performance. Still, extreme good financial performance is not the ultimate goal of most MFIs. Instead, the goal of MFIs -especially non-profit MFIs -is to combat poverty while being financially sustainable, for which they do not need extreme good financial performance. However, for those MFIs searching to maximise financial results powerful CEOs can help achieve this goal as long as they are controlled by stakeholder electives or other outside directors.
Especially non-profit MFIs might benefit from stakeholder electives on the board, since we find that CEO power only has an effect on performance variability in non-profit MFIs, while it has no effect in other MFI types. CEOs in non-profit MFIs have more discretion, because their performance is more difficult to measure and therefore more difficult to control. To increase control of stakeholders over non-profit MFIs effort could be undertaken to bring these MFIs up-to-date with modern governance practices.
When a CEO is not powerful, having no stakeholder electives on the board decreases performance variability. This suggests that the independence of the board should only be promoted when it is needed to offset the power of the CEO, because stakeholder electives can increase the extremity of decisions when a CEO is not powerful Which board decisions result in more or less extreme performance is still unknown.
We observe characteristics of the board and the variability of performance, but we do not observe the actual decisions. We do think that the actual decisions are related to costs, since we only find significant results for operational costs and variables that are influenced by costs.
A possible avenue of future research would be to analyze the relationship between the composition of the board and the actual board decisions. This would help to further identify board compositions that benefit most from increased stakeholder control. Levene (1960) in which the mean is replaced by the 10% trimmed mean. For the entire set of panel observations, we test whether there is a difference in variance when the CEO is also chairman of the board (CEO is chair) versus CEO is not chairman of the board. We perform an F-test for the difference in variance of Return on Assets, Portfolio Yield and Operational Expenses. We report means for these variables with their standard deviation between round brackets. We report the F-statistic together with the p-value between square brackets. 
